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Abstract
Minimum standards set by a ‘World Environmental Organisation’ (WEO) and NGO
labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental pro-
tection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the
WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes
are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO ‘alternative’ increases industry
resistance to WEO proposals and this may reduce welfare. If, however, the schemes are
run in parallel, existence of the NGO lessens producer opposition to WEO activities.
This allows the WEO to be ‘bolder’ in its proposals, which is good for welfare.
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1 Introduction1
When environmental protection is an international public good the incentive for national
governments to set excessively lax domestic environmental requirements is well-understood,
and the case for a supernational agency, a ‘World Environmental Organization’ (WEO),
setting and policing international environmental standards has long been made.
The exact form of a WEO is the subject of considerable debate in the area of law and
public policy.2 Biermann (2000) explores alternative forms that such an organization might
take, including what he calls the ‘hierarchization model’ in which “a world authority for the
protection of the global environment ...is entrusted with enforcement powers against states
that fail to implement certain standards (possibly agreed on by majority vote).” Esty and
Ivanova (2001) put forth a more decentralized model of what they call a global environmental
organization with four key capacities including (1) decision-making, (2) implementation, (3)
monitoring, and (4) dispute resolution. They propose a double-majority voting mechanism
for dispute resolution mechanism that would prevent disproportional power to either devel-
oped and developing nations.3 Whalley and Zissimos (2001) propose a WEO with a focus
on the internalization of trans-boundary (and possibly intra-national) externalities based on
1 We thank participants at Indiana and Helsinki Universities, at the BIOECON Workshop
on ‘Trade, Biodiversity and Resources’ held in Tilburg 5-6 September 2002, Cees Withagen,
Tim Swanson and Juuso Valimaki for helpful comments. Heyes is at Royal Holloway College,
London University (a.heyes@rhul.ac.uk). Maxwell is at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana
University (jwmax@indiana.edu).
2 Several recent proposals on the structure and powers of a WEO are available at Yale Center for Environ-
mental Law and Policy website http://www.yale.edu/gegdialogue/analyticfoundations.html.
3 Developed nations view a one-country one-vote model as handing an eﬀective veto to developing countries,
while the latter view a one-dollar one vote model as handing an eﬀective veto to developed nations.
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the principle of Coasian bargaining.4 Naturally, issues of sovereignty and willingness of na-
tion states to accede to any proposed WEO are important ones. Though our analysis points
to an individual environmental issue, the usual presumption is that the Organization would
have discretion or influence in suﬃcient policy areas to allow it to encourage participation
though issue-linkage (‘horse-trading’). France has been amongst those countries that have
taken a lead in trying to progress towards a more coercively-oriented WEO, as Juma (2000)
reports: “At a recent meeting of the World Bank in Paris, Lionel Jospin, the French prime
minister, called on the United Nations to establish a world environment organisation to both
create and enforce environmental regulations”.
Regardless of the specifics of various proposals for a WEO most have the following com-
mon features. The WEO will be charged with a goal of reducing global environmental exter-
nalities subject to the limitation that its action should not unduly harm economic growth.
We view this as shorthand for the optimization of global economic welfare. The WEO should
have a dispute resolution mechanism that may involve a form a majority voting or may be
based on the an interpretation of international law.5 The WEO should have monitoring
enforcement powers. These powers may be held centrally within the organization or may
be delegated to national authorities that report to the WEO. In the latter case the WEO
should have the power to sanction governments that fail to comply with mandated standards
4 The studies of the form and function of a WEO arise as an alternative to extending the mandate of the
WTO to take an more active role in deciding “trade and environment” issues. The popular case for such
an extension is pragmatic - that through its ‘ownership’ of trade sanctions the WTO has a ready-made and
eﬀective mechanism for enforcing its rules, at least in the context of traded goods. More generally it is
argued that the established procedures for dispute resolution could readily be reformed to incorporate trade
versus environment trade-oﬀs. Weinstein and Charnovitz (2001) and Rao (2000) provide good analysis.
5 International laws may take the form of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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(in the context of biodiversity protection, for example, CITES determines threatened species
and then imposes trade bans upon parties). Our model of the WEO is highly simplified but
is intended to capture these basic features.
A second option - and one that has gathered in credibility over the past several years -
is to rely on non-governmental environmental groups (NGO’s) such as the WWF to operate
labeling schemes. In a world populated by ‘green’ consumers a sub-set of producers can be
expected to take voluntary steps to improve their environmental performance in order to
obtain a label and extract a green premium. Various voluntary schemes already exist - the
Seafood Eco-Label issued by the Marine Stewardship Council and validated by the WWF,
for example, and the WWF’s Timber Product Eco-Label (Baron (2001)).
Our aim in this paper is to take some steps in comparing the environmental and welfare
implications of what we will short-hand as the ‘WEO’ and ‘NGO’ approaches, and to in-
vestigate how WEO policy-making will be influenced by the existence of non-governmental
alternatives both when a political-economic pressures from producers are present (which
seems realistic) and when they not.
We investigate the relative merits of these two approaches, and the interplay between
them. For example, when the WEO faces producer opposition to its actions, how might
that aﬀect the actions of the NGO? Will standards developed by the WEO lead to higher
or lower levels of social welfare when label-setting NGO’s are present?
In focusing on the interaction we intentionally abstract from a detailed model of the
nature of trade. In Section 2 we set-up a simple framework in which goods are traded and
3
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sold to consumers willing to pay a premium for ‘green’ goods. The environmental attributes
of a good cannot be directly observed by consumers, however, so the green premium will be
paid only if either trade in the undesirable good is banned, or the good carries a reputable
label testifying to its greenness. We assume that the tool available to the WEO is the former,
while the latter tool - which doesn’t require powers of coercion - is used by the NGO. Since
the WEO is an organization of government we assume that it would aim to maximize social
welfare, whilst the environmental NGO’s goal is to maximize environmental quality. A more
general approach of having players maximize a weighted form of social welfare would add
little further insight.
In Sections 2 and 3 we consider the two alternatives on an ‘either/or’ basis. We charac-
terize the outcome under an NGO-run voluntary label scheme, and a WEO-run mandatory
scheme. We find conditions under which each of aggregate environmental damage, pro-
ducer surplus and welfare might be higher under either the WEO regime or under the NGO
alternative.
We explore the impact of political pressure on the WEO in Section 3. Those influences
are themselves shown to depend upon the existence or non-existence of a non-governmental
alternative. We adopt the ‘resistance function’ approach, preferred by Lewis (1996) and
others, and recently used in the context of environmental instrument choice by Lyon and
Maxwell (2002).
For anyWEO-proposed policy we find that the level of industry resistance to the standard
is (weakly) greater when there exists an NGO than when there does not. This is because the
4
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gains to producers from defeating any particular WEO proposal are higher when the NGO
exists than when it does not, because the ‘fall-back’ position - with the voluntary labels
available for those who wish to procure them - is now more attractive. The stakes, from the
point of view of industry, are raised, and that generates extra willingness to resist. While the
anticipation of industry resistance tends to lead the WEO to decrease the stringency of the
standard it proposes (thereby raising the likelihood of the proposal’s passage) we find that
the NGO may serve a ‘back-stop’ function and encourage the WEO to be bolder in what it
proposes.
In Sections 4 and 5 we re-evaluate the results in a setting in which the WEO and NGO
schemes may coexist. In that case all firms must meet the WEO’s environmental require-
ments in order to sell their good, but a sub-set will also choose to do what is required to
obtain the NGO label. The criterion set by the NGO for award of a label may be increasing
or decreasing in the mandatory minimum standard set by the WEO - it being positive (neg-
ative) where the threshold for participation in labelling scheme is comparatively sensitive to
changes in the former (latter). In contrast to the ‘either/or’ case the existence of the NGO
unambiguously improves welfare. In the face of political resistance, where a voluntary and
mandatory scheme may co-exist, the existence of an NGO raises expected social welfare.
The existence of the NGO, with the scope to run a co-existent label, has three eﬀects, each
of which is welfare-improving. It (a) raises welfare in the event that the WEO’s proposal
is implemented and, (b), in the event that it is not. By improving the level of surplus de-
livered to producers in the event of implementation it also, (c), increases the probability of
5
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implementation, which further raises expected welfare.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model
For simplicity we assume that the global industry consists of a large number of firms - one
located in each of a large number n of countries - each produce a single unit of some good.
Production costs are assumed equal to zero. In the absence of regulation production of
each unit of the good imposes environmental damage Z. Firm i can reduce that damage by
an amount x by spending on cleaner production practices and/or redesigning its product.
It can do this at unit cost θi.where θ is distributed f(θ). A low (high) value of θ, then,
would be associated with a technologically-able (technologically-feeble) country such as the
US (Philippines) which would find clean production comparatively cheap (expensive).
The market is populated by a large numberm > n of consumers, each wishing to purchase
at most one unit of the good. Consumers are ‘green’. Without oﬀering a fully-fledged micro-
founded theory of green consumption we capture this by assuming that each consumer has a
willingness-to-pay for the good p(x) where p(0) > 0, p0 > 0, p00 < 0. The good is a credence
good, however, such that consumers will only pay a premium for environmental enhancement
- and firms will only spend on such enhancement - when it is verified by a credible third-
party.6 We assume that p (0) < Z, unregulated production is socially undesirable.
6 It is assumed that product quality can be verified by either the WEO or the NGO. The process of ver-
ification, naturally, would vary with product type, and could include process inspections and/or product
testing. Since a green premium arises from certification it is plausible that firms would be willing to incur
the cost of certification. In this case the green premium that we model below could the thought of as net of
certification costs. For more on the role of certification for credence goods see Fedderson and Gilligan (2001).
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We assume that two sources of credible information exist. The first is the WEO and the
second is an international NGO. Interestingly, these two organizations are likely to provide
information in diﬀerent ways. While NGO’s tend to provide information by setting up
voluntary codes of conduct and then providing labels or seals of approval to firms that
comply, the WEO has the possibility to exclude from trade products deemed to fall short of
its standard.
We model these as follows. The WEO, if called upon to do so, sets and enforces a
minimum environmental standard. To sell its product a firm must comply with the standard.
The NGO, on the other hand, sets a standard and operates a voluntary labelling scheme,
awarding labels to firms that comply with its standards. Both the WEO and NGO are
credible in the eyes of consumers, and complying with a standard (voluntary or mandatory)
set by either generates a ‘green premium’ for the seller. The size of the premium depends
upon the stringency of the standard and the form of the willingness to pay function of
the representative consumer. We do not specify concrete functional forms for p and f , but
throughout most of the analysis focus our attention to specifications that yield turning-point
interior solutions to the WEO’s and NGO’s problems. We regard these as the richest and
most interesting cases, though we note here that there may exist alternative specifications
which yield outcomes characterized by corner solutions.
In addition to the diﬀerences in labelling tools, we assume that the two organizations face
The credibility of information given by the NGO may be underpinned by the NGO’s need to maintain rep-
utation, if for example it would lose its status if it were ‘exposed’ as a purveyor of inaccurate information.
Alternatively, private parties might have legal redress against an NGO that provides false information about
a product, or witholds labels from a firm which should be entitled. For current purposes we simply assume
that the NGO behaves honestly.
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diﬀerent objectives. As noted in the introduction, we assume that the WEO is motivated
to maximize global social welfare, while the NGO maximizes environmental quality. Since
environmental quality is a component of social welfare our assumption locates us as a special
case of a more general set-up in which both organizations maximize a diﬀerentially-weighted
social welfare function.
In the remainder of this section we describe, as benchmark cases, the optimal behaviors
of the NGO and the WEO in environments that are free of pressures from producers. Since
the impacts of these pressures are the focus of the present paper, we leave out much of the
mathematical details of these benchmark cases. These are elaborated in a fuller version of
the paper, available from the authors upon request.
2.1 NGO run regime
In this subsection we describe the behavior of the NGO in a setting where the WEO does
not operate. Under the NGO labelling scheme product i is entitled to carry the label if it
(or its method of production) satisfy the criteria for award, xi > s
n.7
Firm i will label iﬀ p(s)− θisn > p(0), i.e. iﬀ θi < θ0 where
θ0 =
p(sn)− p(0)
sn
. (1)
An interval of low-cost firms acquire the label. We note in passing that sgn
³
∂θ0
∂sn
´
=
sgn (p0(sn).sn − (p(sn)− p(0))) which is negative under the assumptions made in the paper
7 We ignore enforcement and administrative costs, which could straight-forwardly be inserted into a fuller
version.
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(the concave-linear specification). This is the ‘natural’ sign - increasing the stringency of the
labelling criterion will reduce the set of firms that acquire it.8
The NGO is motivated by environmental protection. In establishing and operating a
labelling scheme, therefore, it chooses the labelling criteria sn to minimize
D(sn|vol) =
Z θ0
0
(Z − sn).f(θ)dθ +
Z ∞
θ0
Z.f(θ)dθ. (2)
Recall that Z − sn is the level of environmental damage resulting from production by pro-
ducers of labelled goods while Z is the that generated by producers of non-labelled goods.
In raising sn the NGO trades-oﬀ the lower damage from labelled goods against the envi-
ronmental cost due to reduced participation. Aggregate producer surplus is then:
Π(sn|vol) =
Z θ0
0
[p(sn)− θisn].f(θ)dθ +
Z ∞
θ0
p(0).f(θ)dθ (3)
both components of which are positive. Given (1) these profits exceed p(0), thus, the vol-
untary NGO scheme increases aggregate producer surplus versus the no intervention sce-
nario. The NGO scheme also reduces the aggregate level of environmental damage byR θ0
0
snf(θ)dθ. It follows immediately that the NGO’s labelling scheme raises social welfare
(where W (sn|vol) = Π(sn|vol)−D(sn|vol)).
8 It is worth noting that, under a more general specification, ∂θ0/sn > 0 cannot be ruled out. If the
willingness-to-pay function is rising faster than the marginal cost of adoption, it might be the case that
raising the standard will raise the levels of adoptions.
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2.2 WEO run regime
Consider, now, a model absent the NGO but in which a supernational regulator such as the
WEO sets a minimum criteria, sw, that must be satisfied by any seller. Analytically it makes
no diﬀerence whether sw is set by decree or, probably more likely, by its judgements in a
sequence of test cases.
Firm i will comply with the WEO standards iﬀ p(sw)− θisw > 0, i.e. iﬀ θ < θ00 where
θ00 =
p(sw)
sw
. (4)
An interval of low-cost firms will comply. Note that for sw = sn more firms choose to
comply. In this case the firm’s only alternative is to drop out of production altogether, since
the WEO standard is mandatory. This contrasts with the NGO-operated scheme under
which the firm’s next best alternative was to continue selling an (unlabeled) ‘brown’ good
at price (and therefore profit) p(0).
The WEO acts to maximize global welfare,9 that is sw maximizes
W (sw|man) =
Z θ00
0
[p(sw)− θisw − (Z − sw)].f(θ)dθ. (5)
Compared to the NGO case in (2.1), the impact of the WEO’s imposition of a minimum
9 We choose the maximization of social welfare as a reference case. Plausible arguments exist for alternative
objective functions. If we were thinking about this entity corresponding to a WTO with enhanced powers,
for example, one might posit the maximization of industry profits (or at least place greater weight on those
profits) as an objective function, based on the status of the WTO as a trade promotion body. We address
the influence that corporations might have over the WEO later.
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standard on industry profits,
Π(sw|man) =
Z θ00
0
[p(sw)− θisw].f(θ)dθ, (6)
is less clear. The mandatory nature of the standard means that producers who choose not
to comply are excluded from trade and therefore exit production. Exiting firms clearly lose
from the imposition of the standard, but adopting firms may lose or gain depending on the
level of the green premium generated. Recall these firm will adopt as long as their profits
remain positive, their adoption decision does not involve a comparison between ex ante and
ex post profits.
The impact of the standard on both aggregate environmental damages
D(sw|man) =
Z θ00
0
(Z − sw).f(θ)dθ. (7)
and aggregate social welfare is clear, however. Environmental damages must fall under the
standard since exiting firms no longer pollute and adopting firms produce less pollution.
Social welfare must be (weakly) higher.
2.3 WEO vs NGO
Since the two organizations face diﬀerent objective functions straight-forward comparisons
are diﬃcult. We will initially compare the regimes under the assumption that each organiza-
tion would pick the same standard. In general this will not be the case, but these comparisons
help us motivate the main proposition of this section which presents the conditions under
which the WEO’s optimal standard will deliver higher social welfare than the NGO’s chosen
standard.
11
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We note first that when sn = sw it is true that θ0 < θ00. If the two organizations choose the
same standard more firms will adopt the standard under the WEO regime. This is because
the alternative under the WEO regime is exit (and zero profits) while the alternative under
the NGO regime is continued trade in the dirty product (profits p(0)).
Let us first examine the impact of the two regimes on profits. We see from (3) that
industry profits under the NGO regime, given sn = sw are
Π(sn = sw|vol) =
Z θ0
0
[p(sw)− θisw].f(θ)dθ +
Z ∞
θ0
p(0).f(θ)dθ (8)
while profits under the WEO given the same standard are given by (6). Subtracting (6)
from (3) we see, after some simple algebra, that
Π(sw|man)−Π(sn = sw|vol) =
Z θ00
θ0
[p(sw)− θisw − p(0)].f(θ)dθ
−
Z ∞
θ0
p(0).f(θ)dθ (9)
Clearly the second term on the right-hand side of (9), which denotes the profits of firms
that would exit the industry under the WEO regime, is negative. The first term, which
represents the diﬀerence in profits under the WEO regime and the NGO regime for those
firms that would adopt under the WEO regime but would choose not to under the voluntary
scheme, is also negative. This follows directly from the definition of θ0, which given our
assumption of equal standards is θ0 = (p(sw)− p(0))/sw.
Thus we have shown that industry profits are lower under the WEO regime than under
12
Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment
the NGO regime if each regime lead to the same standard. If the two organizations choose
the same standard any firm that is eﬃcient enough to adopt under either regime will also
receive the same green premium and therefore the same profits. All firms that would choose
not to adopt under the WEO scheme lose. One group loses because they incur the costs of
adoption for which the green premium does not fully compensate. The other group loses
because they are obliged to exit, forgoing positive profits.
Not surprisingly there would be less environmental degradation under the WEO regime.
The extra environmental benefits from the WEO regime arise from the fact that some firms
are forced to exit and from the fact a set of firms that would, in the absence of coercion,
have continued to trade in the ‘brown’ good, comply under the WEO scheme.10
In summary, under the assumption that the NGO and WEO standards are equivalent,
industry profits are higher under the NGO voluntary labelling scheme while aggregate pollu-
tion is lower under the WEOmandatory scheme. This sets the stage for a possibly ambiguous
result concerning social welfare. Indeed, it is not diﬃcult to show that under the restriction
that sn = sw no social welfare ordering of the two schemes can be established. Exits that
occur under the WEO scheme are welfare-enhancing, and the welfare impact of the adoptions
by the sets of firm that adopt under both schemes are the same. However the welfare impact
of adoptions that would occur only under the WEO scheme are less clear. For this group of
firms the adoptions decrease profits, but lower environmental damages.
10If the WEO regime led to a higher standard than the NGO regime the former would unambiguously deliver
lower pollution. Firms adopting would pollute less, and any non-adopters exit causing them to stop polluting
altogether. If the NGO regime chose the higher standard the relative impact on pollution is less clear. Firms
that would adopt under either regime would be polluting less under the NGO regime. However, the WEO
would hold the environmental benefit associated with the forced exit of non-adopters.
13
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While we are unable in general to develop a social welfare ordering of the two regimes
when they are assumed to lead to the same standard, the proceeding analysis leads to the
following (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 1 If WEO induced adoptions are socially desirable the level of welfare under
the optimal WEO standard exceeds social welfare under the optimal NGO standard.
It is worth noting that the proposition does not restrict the relative levels of sw∗ and sn∗.
At the level sn∗ the mandatory WEO regime will induce more adoptions than the voluntary
NGO regime, because the mandatory regime at any level of standard holds the threat of exit.
The only condition placed on the proof is that such adoptions would be socially desirable.
This condition places no constraint on the ultimate level of sw∗.
It is also worth noting that the condition is a suﬃcient but not necessary one. It is
possible that the adoption induced under the mandatory regime could have a negative social
impact (that those adoptions be, in themselves, undesirable) but that overall the welfare
ranking would still hold provided the social welfare benefits of the induced exits dominated.
3 The Political-Economy of WEO in the Presence of
Non-Governmental Alternatives
In the exposition so far we have treated the WEO as a global social welfare maximizer
and the NGO as being concerned with the minimization of environmental damage. This
characterization of the NGO accords with the reality that NGO’s must cater to the desires of
members to ensure future funding, and is one commonly made in the literature. Objections,
however, may be raised over the characterization of the WEO’s objective. The WEO is
14
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likely to be subject to pressures from industries (perhaps via national governments, perhaps
directly). If we were to regard the WTO as being charged with these extended powers this
is most evidently likely to be true. It is frequently asserted (certainly by protestors on the
streets of Seattle and elsewhere) that the WTO is subject to capture by producer interests.
We model these pressures in this section by modelling the WEO as a welfare maximizer
subject to political constraints.
We follow the approach of Lewis (1996), recently applied by Lyon and Maxwell (2002),
in assuming that the probability that the WEO will be successful in implementing a policy
described by the mandatory minimum standard s will be a concavely decreasing function ρ
of industry resistance to the standard, with ρ(∆) < 1, ∀∆ > 0. Also following Lewis (1996)
we treat the level of industry resistance ∆ as equalling the aggregate decrease in producer
surplus implied by the regulation, measured against an appropriate benchmark. Since, here,
∆may be positive or negative (which would imply industry support) we qualify the approach
of these authors by assuming that ρ(∆) = 1 for all ∆ ≤ 0.
The resistance function is meant to capture the impact of political battles that might
take place between nations as their respective domestic industries are helped and harmed by
WEO proposals. As we show below, this political constraint will generally cause the WEO to
distort what it proposes. The WEO might weaken (or possibly strengthen) what it proposes
in order to improve the probability of passage. Alternative approaches would have been to
simply have the WEO fully captured by industry interests (which some would claim to be
realistic) and hence either maximizing aggregate producer surplus or acting to maximize the
15
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interests of the median firm type, a contest model (Heyes (1997)) or a common agency model
(Grossman and Helpman (1994)).
In the absence of an alternative prospective policy actor, resistance would simply be the
diﬀerence between the proposed WEO rule, say s0, and the level of profit without policy
intervention. In other words, in that case:
∆(s) =
Z ∞
0
p(0).f(θ).dθ −Π(s0|man) (10)
Define bθ = (p(sw)− p(0))/sw, we can then write
∆(s) =
Z bθ
0
[p(0)− {p(sw)− θsw}]f(θ)dθ
+
Z θ00
bθ [p(0)− {p(s
w)− θsw}]f(θ)dθ
+
Z ∞
θ00
p(0)f(θ)dθ (11)
The first term on the right hand side of (11), is negative and represents the profits of those
firms that would gain from the imposition of a WEO imposed standard of sw. These firms
gain because their adoption costs are lower than the green premium they will collect. The
second term is positive. For this group of firms adoption costs exceed the green premium,
however the firms will adopt since their post-adoption profits are positive. The final term
denoted the profits of all those firms that will exit under the WEO standard, and is therefore
positive. Thus, in general ∆ cannot be signed. Regulation here does not simply add to costs,
the existence of a green premium which can only be reaped if regulation occurs means that
16
Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment
the impact of a WEO minimum standard on producer surplus may be positive or negative
(in the spirit of Rege (2000)).
While our result is not necessarily surprising (regulation, in general, creates winners and
losers) it is interesting to note that the likelihood of political opposition to the WEO standard
(the probability that ∆(s) > 0) falls with the responsiveness of the premium, dp/ds.
This result suggests that we might expect more resistance to WEO standards in industries
that are further removed from end consumers, since green premium responsiveness will likely
be low in those industries. This result also suggests that rather than proposing alternative
standards, which we consider directly below, environmental groups might wish to engage in
the promotion of awareness of WEO standards.
WEO behavior with no NGO labelling alternative
For the moment we will maintain our assumption that the WEO operates in a world
where NGOs do not exist. Under political economic constraint a forward-looking WEO will
recognize that industry-resistance is endogenous, and take account of that endogeneity in
formulating its policy proposal. It will thus propose a policy to maximize expected welfare
E(W |∅) = ρ(∆(s0)).W (s0|man) + (1− ρ(∆(s0)).W (∅). (12)
where W (∅) denotes welfare in the absence of any intervention (the status quo welfare
level).
We will denote by sw
0
the solution to that problem - the second best policy that the
17
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WEO will choose to try to implement under political constraint. An interior solution to the
problem will be implicitly described by ∂E(W |∅)/∂s = 0 or11
ρ.
∂W (sw
0|man)
∂s
− ρ0.∂Π(s
w0|man)
∂s
³
W (sw
0|man)−W (∅)
´
= 0 (13)
In the absence of political considerations, recall, the WEO would choose a standard
such as to make ∂W (sw|man)/∂s = 0, so the second composite term in (13) captures the
distortion due to the potential for producer opposition. Rearranging, we can see that under
political constraint,
∂W (sw
0|man)
∂s
=
ρ0
ρ|{z}
<0
.
∂Π(sw
0|man)
∂s
.
³
W (sw
0|man)−W (∅)
´
| {z }
>0
≶ 0 (14)
The direction in which the political considerations distort the WEO’s choice of (proposed)
standard is determined by the sign of the second term on the right side of (14). Combined
with concavity of the WEO’s problem this implies:
∂Π(sw
0|man)
∂s
< 0 =⇒ sw0 < sw (15)
11Space constraints preclude characterization of the attendant corner solutions.
The two candidate corners are those in which the WEO sets sw = 0 or sets sw at an arbitrarily high
level. The first corresponds to not regulating (setting a criteria that all firms can satisfy at zero cost), the
latter to trying to close down the industry (setting a standard that no firm will choose to meet). Given our
assumptions on p(0) and Z we note that the latter corner necessarily yields higher welfare than the former,
so we can discount sw = 0 as a solution to the WEO’s problem here.
We focus on contexts in which the solution to the WEO’s problem is an interior one - in which it would
wish to set a criterion that, if implemented, atleast 1 firm would choose to satisfy.
18
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and vice versa. If aggregate profits under mandatory regulation are locally decreasing in the
stringency of that regulation then the proposed minimum standard will be set below the
socially optimal level. If, on the other hand, these are locally increasing political realities
will lead to the proposed standard being revised upward. We can establish the following
(proof in Appendix):
Proposition 2 The threat of industry resistance leads the WEO to decrease its standard so
as to raise the likelihood of implementation. In doing so the level of expected social welfare
falls from its no resistance level.
Although it is apparent that producers as a whole benefit from the distortion in the
WEO’s choice of standard we can also observe the distribution of benefits across the sector.
For marginal changes in s, evaluated in the vicinity of equilibrium we can write,
∂Π(sw
0|man)
∂s
=
Z θ00
0
[p0(sw
0
)− θ0 ]f(θ)dθ (16)
Since we know that sw
0
< sw∗ and Π(sw
0|man) > Π(sw∗|man) it follows that
Z θ00(sw∗)
0
[(p(sw
0
)− p(sw∗))− θ(sw0 − sw∗)]f(θ)dθ (17)
+
Z θ00(sw0)
θ00(sw∗)
[p(sw
0
)− θsw0 ]f(θ)dθ
is positive. We can see that the second term in (17) is unambiguously positive. Thus, the
distortion of the standard works to the benefit of moderately eﬃcient firms. The sign of the
first term is ambiguous, and depends on the shape of the willingness-to-pay function. While
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the green premium will be lower at a lower standard, firms save money in compliance. Thus
if the green premium is suﬃciently unresponsive highly eﬃcient firms might also benefit from
a lower standard.
In the previous section we derived conditions under which a standard imposed by the
WEO would lead to a higher level of welfare than would a labelling scheme operated by an
NGO. The WEO scheme was preferable because it induced both more adoptions and more
exits. Proposition 2 dictates that we qualify this support. In face of political opposition the
WEO will wish to weaken the standard. The weakening diminishes social welfare, and it is
possible that if opposition is suﬃciently high (or the level of resistance suﬃciently responsive)
the standard proposed by the WEO might lead to a lower level of social welfare than might
arise from a voluntary NGO scheme.
WEO behavior in the face of an NGO labelling alternative
To this point we have analyzed the impact of political opposition when industry or
national governments face no alternative to the standard proposed by the WEO. We now
study how the WEO’s choice of standard is aﬀected by the possibility of a voluntary NGO
supported standard. Assume, initially, that the WEO and NGO programs are mutually
exclusive. There is no reason in general - in the absence of regulatory constraint, of the sort
proposed in the context of genetically-modified (GM) foods - for the two schemes not to be
able to run in parallel, and we drop the assumption of mutual exclusivity in Sections 4 and
5. It is worth noting, however, that we have not explicitly modelled the costs associated with
setting up and operating these schemes. For both schemes there will be (fixed and variable)
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certification costs as well as (largely fixed) costs associated with publicity. The existence of
such costs raises the plausibility of the assumption of mutual exclusivity.
In this case industry resistance to any proposed WEO rule s0 can be represented:
∆(s0) = Π(sn∗|vol)−Π(s0|man) (18)
It is useful to compare (18) with (10), where the first term on the right-hand side repre-
sents Π(∅), status quo industry profits. Although we have shown above that there must be
a positive level of resistance under the assumption that the WEO and NGO standards are
equal, this condition of equality will not hold in general.
Again, in principle there is nothing to stop ∆ being negative. If Π(sn∗|vol) < Π(sw∗|man)
then the political constraint is non-binding. More interesting, though, are those (perhaps
more plausible) cases in which the voluntary regime that the NGO would run if it got
the chance is preferred by producers in aggregate to the WEO’s preferred mandatory rule.
Because the NGO scheme is voluntary it must be the case that
Π(sn∗|vol) ≥ Π(∅) =
Z ∞
0
p(0)f(θ)dθ (19)
That is, industry in aggregate can do no worse under the NGO scheme than it would
under no scheme. If the NGO scheme is such that at least one firm participates then the
expression holds with strict inequality. It is straight-forward to confirm that for any f(.) the
NGO will indeed set sn to ensure at least one firm participates (we can rule out a corner
solution to the NGO’s problem). This observation leads directly to the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 For any WEO-proposed policy the level of industry resistance to the standard
is (weakly) greater when there exists an NGO than when there does not.
The gains to producers from defeating any particular WEO proposal are higher when
the NGO exists than when it does not, because the ‘fall-back’ position no longer implies
aggregate profits Π(∅) but the higher level of profits Π(sn|vol). The stakes, from the point
of view of producers, are raised, and that generates extra willingness to resist.
Thus, in proposing a standard the WEO, faced with the possibility of an alternative NGO
voluntary standard will propose a policy s0 to maximize
E(W |vol) = ρ(∆(s0|vol)).W (s0|man) + (1− ρ(∆(s0|vol)).W (sn∗|vol). (20)
We will denote by sw
0
vol the solution to (20). Again we can investigate the second best
solution to the WEO’s problem here. An interior solution will be implicitly defined by
∂E(W |vol)/∂s = 0 or12
ρ.
∂W (sw
0
vol |man)
∂s
− ρ0.∂Π(s
w0vol |man)
∂s
³
W (sw
0
vol|man)−W (sn∗|vol)
´
= 0 (21)
The second composite term in (38) again captures distortion. Rearranging, we can see
that under political constraint,
12We again omit characterization of the associated corner outcomes, focussing on contexts in which the solu-
tion to the WEO’s problem is an interior one - in which it would wish to set a criterion that, if implemented,
at least 1 firm would choose to satisfy. We note them as possibilities, however (refer back to footnote (11)).
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∂W (sw
0
vol|man)
∂s
=
ρ0
ρ|{z}
<0
.
∂Π(sw
0
vol |man)
∂s
.
³
W (sw
0
vol|man)−W (sn∗|vol)
´
| {z }
>0
≶ 0 (22)
Again we see that the direction of the distortion is dictated by the impact on aggregate
industry profits. By arguments similar to those used in establishing Proposition 2 we see
that the WEO will lower its choice of standard in order to raise the likelihood of its passage,
resulting again in lower welfare than would be achieved in the absence of political opposition.
The more interesting question to ask, however, is what impact does the (potential) existence
of the NGO’s program have on social welfare. As the following proposition points out the
impact is ambiguous (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 4 In the face of industry resistance, the existence of an NGO labeling scheme
as an alternative to the WEO standard may increase or decrease the proposed standard, and
has an ambiguous eﬀect on expected social welfare.
Absent political resistance, we have shown that the WEO’s optimal standard leads to a
level of social welfare that is strictly greater than that under an NGO standard, given the
NGO’s preferred choice of labeling criterion. In this section, however, we have shown that
political resistance will cause the WEO to lower its standard and in so doing lower social
welfare (relative to the no resistance case).
The introduction of the NGO scheme as a potential alternative, in a setting of political
resistance, has an ambiguous aﬀect on both the level of the standard and the resulting level
of social welfare. While the NGO scheme will raise the level of resistance facing any given
WEO proposal, the fact that the NGO’s scheme has a positive impact on welfare means
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that the WEO obtains less expected benefit from lowering its standard. The existence of
the NGO as a ‘back-stop’ - because recall that W (sn∗|vol) > W (∅) - also has the eﬀect of
allowing the WEO to be ‘bolder’ in its proposals, making proposals closer to the solution to
its problem absent constraint.
4 The WEO and NGO in Parallel: Coexistence
In Section 3 we have treated the NGO as a potential alternative to the WEO. This has been
formalized in the modelling by assuming that the NGO would only step into the breach
in the event that the WEO - by choice or because of resistance from producers - failed to
implement a mandatory regulatory standard.
It may well, however, be more realistic to think of the possibility of the two coexisting.
The WEO setting - or seeking to set - a mandatory minimum standard, the NGO operating
a voluntary labelling scheme. This is what we consider here. The behavior of each will,
naturally, be inter-dependent. The analysis also allows us to shed light on the question of
whether the WEO should be given monopoly in the domain, or whether NGO’s should be
allowed to operate in parallel.13
In setting up the game between WEO and NGO it is natural to think of the former
moving first, the NGO following. This is the sequence of moves that we adopt for the
purposes of modelling the rest of the paper. We believe this to be the most natural (perhaps
the only natural) timing of moves for this game. While it may be the case that some
13There has been discussion of these sorts of issues in the context of the private labeling of genetically
modified (GM) foods. If the WTO, for example, chooses not to apply GM labels or ban trade in GM
products, should individual firms or national governments be allowed to apply labels of their own? United
States interests have claimed not.
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NGO schemes may predate development of a WEO, the modelling issue here relates more
to the adjustability of standards set by the two bodies. The WEO set rules are likely to be
subject to complex perhaps lengthy processes of political ratification and may even emerge
as embodied in case law and precedent. As such these rules, once set, are likely to be very
diﬃcult to change quickly, if at all. The NGO labelling criteria, on the other hand, are likely
to be things that can be change comparatively quickly and straight-forwardly. The NGO is a
private agent and whilst it may not want to chop and change too much (because it needs to
establish reputation, or for other reasons) there is likely to be little restriction on it changing
how it chooses to set the hurdle for acquisition or retention of a label.14
With a slight adjustment of the notation used earlier we can represent aggregate in-
dustry profits, environmental damage, and welfare as Π(sw, sn), D(sw, sn) and W (sw, sn)
respectively. The NGO-only and WEO-only outcomes characterized above are then the
special cases associated with sw = 0 and sn = 0 respectively.
4.1 No Political Constraints
In the event that a WEO-set mandatory standard and an NGO-set voluntary standard co-
exist it must trivially be the case that sn > sw. Defining θ0(sw, sn) = [p(sn)− p(sw)] /sn and
θ00(sw) = p(sw)/sw, firms can be considered in three classes. If θi ≤ θ0 the firm will both
comply with the WEO standard and engage in the additional enhancement needed to secure
14Even in a model involving simultaneous announcements of standards it would make sense to allow the NGO
to “adjust” ex post at low cost. This would amount to the same thing as appointing it follower. NGO’s
are unlikely to have access to perfect commitment mechanisms, even if they wished to use them, whilst
WEO decisions are likely to have a “putty-clay” flavour by virtue of the institutional/political environment
in which the WEO has to operate.
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the NGO’s label. If θ0 ≤ θi ≤ θ00 the firm will comply with the WEO standard (which it
must do to be allowed to trade) but not label. If θi > θ
00 the firm will exit. Everything on
the “supermarket shelf” will be understood to embody the WEO’s minimum standards. The
NGO’s label will find itself attached to a sub-set of products with “premium” environmental
characteristics.
We can observe that the interval of firms choosing to sign-up for any voluntary labelling
scheme is decreasing in both sn and sw. Though space precludes a full characterization of the
game between NGO and WEO, we can sketch its elements. The NGO moves second, taking
sw as given, and chooses the criterion to set for award of a label. It is straight-froward to
establish that dD(sw, sw)/dsn is necessarily negative such that the NGO will always wish to
run a labelling program (we can rule out the corner solution) and sn will then be chosen to
minimize
dD(sw, sn)/dsn =
Z θ0(sw,sn)
0
(Z − sn).f(θ).dθ +
Z θ00(sw)
θ0(sw,sn)
(Z − sw).f(θ)dθ. (23)
Optimization of (23) implicitly defines the NGO’s reaction function, that is sn as a func-
tion of sw, γ(sw). After some algebra one can show that the NGO’s choice of sn may be
increasing or decreasing in the mandatory minimum standard set by the WEO. It will be pos-
itive (negative) when the threshold for participation in the labelling scheme is comparatively
sensitive to changes in the former (latter).
The dependence of sn upon sw gives the WEO the opportunity to influence the charac-
teristics of the labelling scheme set-up by the NGO. The WEO’s problem, then, is to choose
26
Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment
sw - anticipating what the NGO will do in following - to maximize W (sw, γ(sw)). It can be
shown that the endogeneity of the NGO’s decision-making will cause the WEO to weaken its
standard if the indirect impact of a such weakening - via induced changes in sn - increases
welfare. This can happen either if (a) γ0 is negative and the NGO tends to set sn lower than
is socially optimal or (b) if γ0 is positive but the NGO tends to set sn to high. Otherwise
the WEO will respond to the endogeneity of the characteristics of the labelling scheme by
toughening the standard it itself sets.
Despite the ambiguities inherent in the interaction between the WEO and the NGO,
however, it is comparatively straight-forward to establish the following (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 5 Absent political pressure from producers the existence of the NGO raises
welfare.
5 Political Resistance in the Co-Existence Case
We can conduct the same sort of exercise in the co-existence case as we did when the WEO
and NGO were considered on an either/or basis.
In the earlier analysis the WEO, anticipating the threat of producer opposition, was in
eﬀect proposing a standard sw to maximize
ρ(∆(sw)).W (sw, 0) + (1− ρ(∆(sw)).W (0, sn). (24)
If implementation was successful the WEO’s proposed rule would pass into law and usage
and the NGO would be excluded.
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The WEO’s problem is now somewhat diﬀerent - as is the opposition that any particular
proposal will dominate. If it is successful in implementing its proposed mandatory standard it
anticipates that the NGO may choose to establish and operate a voluntary labelling scheme.
If it is unsuccessful the outcome is the same as before - the NGO runs a labelling scheme in
isolation. In this circumstance the WEO, then, will propose a standard to maximize:
ρ(∆).W (sw, γ(sw)) + (1− ρ(∆).W (0, γ(0)) (25)
where industry resistance will be
∆ = Π(0, γ(0))−Π(sw, γ(sw)). (26)
In light of earlier results, and noting that Π(sw, γ(sw)) > Π(sw, 0) we can observe that:
Lemma 6 Producer opposition to any given WEO proposal will be less when the NGO exists,
and less when the WEO and NGO can co-exist than in the ‘either/or’ case.
How will the WEO distort its decision making in these circumstances? The first-order
condition characterizing the solution to the WEO’s problem can be written:
∂W
∂sw
+
∂W
∂sn
.γ0 = −ρ
0
ρ|{z}
>0
.(W (sw, γ(sw))−W (0, γ(0))| {z }
>0
.
µ
∂∆
∂sw
+
∂∆
∂sn
.γ0
¶
. (27)
In the absence of political considerations ρ = 1 and ρ0 = 0, any WEO proposal is
implemented without hurdle. In that case, recall, the WEO sets the welfare-maximizing
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standard - taking account of the fact that the NGO as follower will supplement it with a
voluntary scheme of its own - to equate the full marginal impact of a change in sw upon
welfare given implementation and taking account of induced changes in the design of the
NGO’s voluntary oﬀering, equal to zero. Under political constraint the distortion will depend
upon the sign of the final term on the right-hand side of (27), which is the full (direct plus
indirect) marginal impact of changes in sw upon aggregate producer surplus. Again, and in
the same spirit as earlier results, the political realities will lead the WEO to bias its proposals
in favor of producers.
We can, though, proceed to the following (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 7 In the face of political resistance, where a voluntary and mandatory scheme
may co-exist, the existence of an NGO raises expected social welfare.
The existence of the NGO, with the scope to run a co-existent label, has three eﬀects,
each of which is welfare-improving. It (a) raises welfare in the event that the WEO’s proposal
is implemented and, (b), in the event that it is not. It also, (c), increases the probability of
implementation, which further raises expected welfare.
This result contrasts with the earlier proposition which pointed to the ambiguity of the
welfare impact of the NGO in the ‘either/or’ setting. It says that in a world in which
political pressures upon the WEO are a reality, the WEO will be more eﬀective in pursuing
its own aims - global welfare maximization - when the private labeling is not presented as an
alternative but as a complementary mechanism. Under political constraint private regulation
will complement public.
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6 Conclusions
We have taken some significant steps towards understanding the interplay between public
(mandatory) and private (voluntary) regulatory schemes in the context of environmental
protection. A feature of the analysis has been the explicit characterization of the inter-
play between the alternatives, both directly (where co-existence was admitted) and through
politico-economic channels.
Section 2 presented a straight-forward comparison of outcomes under the alternative
regimes, leading to an ambiguous welfare ranking. Section 3 showed how the existence of
an NGO ‘competitor’ would harden producer resistance to WEO proposals, lead the WEO
to reduce the stringency of its proposals below there socially preferred levels, and could
reduce expected welfare. The ‘either/or’ approach of Sections 2 and 3 was in the spirit of
the traditional instrument choice literature (taxes vs. standards, etc).
In Sections 4 and 5 we revisited the analysis under the assumption that NGO and WEO
activities could coexist. With or without producer resistance it was established that the
existence of the NGO raises expected welfare.
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8 Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1). Let sn∗ denote the solution to the problem in (2), that is the
optimal standard of the NGO. Recalling our assumption that unregulated production is
socially undesirable, p(0) < Z, we see that
W (sw = sn∗|man)−W (sn∗|vol) =
Z θ00
θ0


{p(sn∗)− θsn∗ − (Z − sn∗)}
−{p(0)− Z}

 f(θ)dθ
−
Z ∞
θ00
[p(0)− Z]f(θ)dθ, (28)
which is positive under the assumption stated in the proposition. Thus,W (sw = sn∗|man) >
W (sn∗|vol). But it is true by definition that W (sw∗|man) −W (sw = sn∗|man), where sw∗
denotes the socially optimal choice of the standard under the mandatory regime. These
relations together imply that W (sw∗|man) > W (sn∗|vol).
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Proof. (Proposition 2). The results of (13) and (14) indicated that political resistance
causes a distortion away from the social welfare optimum that would be chosen absent
political resistance. It follows from (14) that the purpose of the distortion is to raise profits
under the standard, and hence lower political resistance to it. Thus it must be true that
Π(sw
0|man) > Π(sw∗|man). Note, however, that if sw0 > sw∗ environmental damage would
be lower at sw
0
. This would mean that W (sw
0|man) > W (sw∗|man) but this is false by the
definition of sw∗. Thus it must be the case that the distortion caused by political resistance
is to lower the standard. This in turn raises profits but also raises environmental damage
and ultimately lowers social welfare from the level that would be achieved absent political
resistance.
Proof. (Proposition 4). We see from (22) that the distortion under an NGO alternative
is of the same form as when no alternative exists (14). The extent of the distortion is aﬀected
by the level of industry resistance and the level of welfare in the event the WEO standard
fails to pass. As we have shown, industry resistance is higher when an NGO alternative
exists. This will have the eﬀect of increasing the extent of the downward distortion in the
WEO standard. The second eﬀect, however, works as a counter balance. Observe the final
brackets in (22) and (14). Since we know that welfare is higher under an NGO scheme
than under no scheme, it follows that bracketed term in (22) is smaller than its counterpart
in (14), which has the eﬀect of reducing the distortion in the WEO’s proposal. In eﬀect
the marginal benefit to reducing the standard from sw∗ is lower when the possibility of the
NGO scheme exists. This causes the WEO to be more bold in its proposal. The ambiguity
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regarding the impact on welfare is not dependent simply on ambiguity in the level of the
proposed standard, but also because the welfare function W (s|man) need not be monotone
in s.
Proof. (Proposition 5). Let sw˜ be the value of sw that maximizes W (sw, 0). It must
be the case that Π(sw˜, γ(sw˜)) > Π(sw˜, 0) (by implication of voluntary participation) and
D(sw˜, γ(sw˜)) < D(sw˜, 0) (by NGO design) and hence W (sw˜, γ(sw˜)) > W (sw˜, 0). If the
solution to the problem in is something other than sw˜ (as will generically be the case) then
the resulting level of welfare can only, by definition, exceed W (sw˜, γ(sw˜)).
Proof. (Proposition 7). Let sw# be the value of sw that maximizes
ρ(∆(sw, 0)).W (sw, 0) + (1− ρ(∆(sw, 0)).W (0, 0) (29)
Then note that W (sw#, 0) must exceed W (0, 0) by definition. We also know that (a)
W (sw#, γ(sw#)) > W (sw#, 0), (b) W (0, γ(0)) > W (0, 0). Together with the first part of
Lemma 6 these imply that if the WEO proposes sw# expected welfare is greater when there
exists an NGO than when there does not. If the solution to the problem in (25) is something
other than sw# (as will generally be the case) then the resulting level of welfare can only, by
definition, be higher still.
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